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In recent years, the concept of social democracy has gained wide currency among Argentine politi-
cal elites. After years of contempt, important sectors representing the Radical and Peronista parties, as
well as the Left and the intelligentsia, accept this type of ideological identification. This merits some
exploration of the historical roots of the social-democratic experience in Argentina and its place in the
political party spectrum in the years to come.
Social democracy in Europe was an adaptation of the values of socialism (a universal religion) to
the specific conditions of each country. The organized working class soon adopted the ideology, which
faced liule competition from other well-entrenched politicalloyalties. The liberal, radical, or Social
Christian convictions of some popular sectors were, in a sense, remains of an earlier period, which
never became a strongly rooted altemative expression for working-class interests. This is in contrast to
what happens in the United States and in many Third World countries. Leaving aside the very special
case of the United States, in many parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, some form of populism or
radical nationalism successfully competes with socialism, often adoming itself with socialist ideology
or tradition. The case of peronismo in Argentina is one of the better-known examples.
At the inception of the socialist ideology, Latin American conditions were not ripe for au-
tonomous action by the working class. In fact, conditions were scarcely adequate for consolidating a
capitalist bourgeoisie. However, there already existed a tradition and an experience of popular rebellion,
from Túpac Amaro to the Mexican Insurgencia and the slave rebellion in Haiti. These rebellions in-
cluded caudillista movements, some of which were quite radical, like artiguismo; others, like rosismo,
were more conservative, although no less successful at mobilizing the masses. In Europe, comparable
events were part of a tradition of popular struggles that socialism later incorporated. This is particu-
larly the case of the French Revolution; although the bourgeoisie capitalized on it, its most radical as-
pects became antecedents of socialist ideology. In other words, socialism is in many ways a meditation
on the French Revolution and on the subsequent revolutions of 1830, 1848, and 1871. The popular
rebellions and caudillista movements in Latin America, in contrast, are relatively devoid of ideological
interpreters, and they have not been incorporated into the corpus of a theoretical structure with any
pretension of universal validity. For example, the insurgents of the 1810 Mexican rebellion are a part
of the Mexican pantheon, but they are hardly known or taken seriously in the rest of the continent.
The same applies to the other cases mentioned, which may be celebrated by patriotic nationalism, but
never became part of a universalist narrative with theoretical or ideological value.
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Those historical events in Latin America were ignored, distorted, or taken as objects of antiquarian
interest by Marx and his first followers. They were not considered when formulating the theoretical
structure necessary for the struggle for socialism, unlike the conclusions drawn from critical interpreta-
tions of the French or even the English revolutions. This attitude was adopted by the first socialists in
our continent, mostly in Argentina, Uruguay, southem Brazil, and Chile, where the massive influx of
European immigration was very influential.
At the turn of the century in several parts of Latin America, a labor force existed that could be
unionized to take collective action against the established order. This labor force was of two types: the
European immigrants in countries like Argentina and Uruguay, where it was expected they would copy
Australia in reproducing,in "empty zones," political and social conditions similar to those in Europe;
and, in Mexico, Peru, northem Chile, and other areas, important concentrations of mining or agro-in-
dustriallabor, made up mainly of native laborers with a small component of foreign migrants. These
zones were not "empty," and thus intellectuals became more concemed with their local traditions.
Between 1910 and 1917, the revolutions that took place in Mexico, China, and Russia quickly
adopted anti-imperialist and anticapitalist components. The effect that the Russian Revolution has had
on the world should not make us put aside the other two, especially-from a Latin American perspec-
tive-the Mexican Revolution. Just as a previous generation thought that the Zeitgeist had settled in
France when the Bastille fell-ignoring the siege of the Alhóndiga of Granaditas in Guanajuato-a
subsequent group considered the Russian revolution part of a historical world process and the Mexican
Revolution as an episode of local interest with no thcoretical value. 1 do not pretend here to deny the
importance of the French or the Russian events, but the level of conceptual and theoretical elaboration
of which Russia and France have been the object, in comparison with Mexico, even in Latin America,
is simply part of the cultural dependency that affects this part of the world. In any event, after World
War 1, the social-democratic ideology found two important rivals that operated on the same intellectual
and labor groups and that had a greater ability to reach the rural and marginal masses. They were
Leninist socialism and revolutionary nationalism.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, social democracy in Argentina was consolidated into a
Socialist party, which slowly integrated the anarchists and revolutionary Syndicalists. It was flanked
by a Communist party, which was oriented to reform and popular fronts. With some hindsight, one
can see that socialism in Argentina already suffered from certain shortcomings that hindered its penetra-
tion into those parts of the country that were less touched by European immigration. A certain
dogmatism made it difficult for socialism 10capture a part of the electorate of the popular party of that
time, the Unión Cívica Radical. But until the advent of peronismo the Socialist party projected itself
as the political spokesman for the country's organized working class and intellectuallower middle class,
following the social-democratic model.
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The Conjuncture of 1943
When the military took over in 1943, strongly supported by the Radical Right, various altema-
tives existed for those who were oriented to social reform based on working-class political action:
(1) The classic social-democratic model, as in the British Labour party, strongly tied to trade
unions and inwhich the lower middle class and the intellectuals are the main leaders and activists. A
variety of this model was a Popular Front in alliance with a moderate Communist party and the Radi-
cals. Until this point, the situation in Argentina and Chile was close to the classic social-democratic
model. The ideology was more rigid in the case of Argentina, a country that could pretend, more than
Chile, because of its migratory influx, to be a transoceanic reproduction of European countries or Aus-
tralia and New Zealand.
(2) The Mexican-Avrista model. which involved the formation of popular political parties with
leaders from the middle class, the bourgeoisie, or even the military, and support from weakly organized
but mobilized trade unions. It Was thought that this model Wasappropriate for lesser-developed coun-
tries with an important Indian component. The Radical party in Argentina, apart from what it could
have been at the peak of Yrigoyen's popularity, did not appear to follow this model, but rather repre-
sented a centrist force with which alliances could be established. It did not seem to be sufficientIy
committed lOsocial change, although it did guarantee democratic consolidation.
(3) The Leninist or revolutionarv socialist model was frozen by soviet foreign politics but was
practiced in some places like China, although during the war it stilllacked the visibility that it later
acquired. In some countries in the area there were groups sharing this ideology, but without enough
backing, as the only country that had practiced it successfully no longer encouraged it. This, however,
could change in any moment, in which case the model would acquire a greater potential. It was, in any
case, more likely lObe applied in the lesser-developed countries.
(4) Popular caudillismo, which was strong in the last century in the Río de la Plata and other parts
of the continent, could be reactivated with a charismatic civil or military leader. However, there were
no actual examples of this type, save an attempt at "military socialism" in Bolivia or the "tenentismo"
partially expressed through Vargas in Brazil. One could also imagine a local version of fascism as a
"third force" between capitalism and communism. But fascism was seen by most intellectuals, except
in certain Catholic and nationalistic sectors, as being right-wing and reactionary.
The particular social tensions that existed in Argentina during the Second World War-together
with the industrialization that the country was experiencing, which needed protection to consolidate the
growth induced by the war-produced a real mutation in the political party system. Before the war the
Argentinian system was very much lile Chile's, recognizing European models. On the Left, me so-
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cialist gamut had electoral following in Chile, and a not negligible one in Argentina. On both sides of
the Andes radicalismo was in the middle. The Right had a strong electorate in Chile, although it re-
sorted to some vote purchasing; in Argentina it was weak, but capable of putting up a fight in some
provinces. The party system survived in spite of disturbances in Chile and overcame the merely tem-
porary impact of ibañismo in 1952. In Argentina, on the other hand, in 1943 there emerged from the
military sector a new political project which was headed by Perón and supported by an elite of a very
heterogeneous ideological composition. The majority of the leftist intellectuals, directly or indirectly
tied to the previous socialist pole, firmly opposed what they saw as an American reproduction ofEuro-
pean fascism, with the same ability to fill the plazas and mobilize against the centers of high finance
and intemational capitalismo Among the more militant old trade unionists there was also considerable
opposition, although a number of them sided with the new movement. Their support reflected the ac-
cess of the masses, which had not previously been incorporated into the system. Given their migratory
nature or their previous passivity, the masses were favorably disposed to patemalistic authority, which
Juan B. Justo had labeled "política criolla." They were, actually, Creoles, defining the term loosely to
incIude also the sons and daughters of foreigners who wanted to reaffirm their nationality against the
excessive Eurocentrism of the Left, from social-democrat to anarchist to Communist.
Could the Argentine Left have reacted differently to the threat that originated from the secretary of
labor in the military regime? The possibility should certainly be admitted. There is the nearby exam-
pIe of Chile, in which the Left knew how to react successfully against a similar populist challenger,
General Ibáñez, with a mixture of alliance, negotiation, and opposition. In any event, and without
denying the possibility or even the desirability of a different reaction, the fact is that the cards were
dealt in such a way that it was difficult for the Argentinian parties and groups leaning toward socialismo
We must keep in mind the fact that the ideological distortion caused by the European model at the in-
teIlectuallevel generated a "demonstration effect" that was much stronger in the Río de la Plata than in
the rest of the continent. AIso, the enormous impact of foreign immigration, unequaled in any other
part of the world, had created a great political void not only in the elite but also in the popular sectors.
For decades not only the great majority of the bourgeoisie and the skilled working cIass had been for-
eigners for the most part little integrated into the system of civic participation. This vacuum of
participation debilitated, even made impossible, the emergence of a strong progressive bourgeois party,
which Juan B. Justo wished to see as much as a socialist one. In its place there was a conservative
landowners' party and a Radical party anchored in the middle cIass, neither of which was originaIly
linked to the urban bourgeoisie. The foreign origin of the masses also weakened the bond between the
working class and the party system which could represent them in Congress, which gave cIay feet as
much to the Socialist as to the Communist party.
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Peranismo demonstrated that it did not have a great respect for the system of public liberties and
balance of powers. Its authoritarian aspects were evident fram the start, were, in fact, inherent in its
origin in the military dictatorship of 1943. One of its first victims was the Partido Laborista, the
principal partisan organ that carried the popular movement lo power. Some of the old trade union
leaders, unlike the foreign-oriented Socialist party, which was also more closely patterned after the
French or German centralized models than the highly federative one practiced in England, had thought
to reproduce the British experience but with a nationalist emphasis Before assuming power, Perón
dissolved the Partido Laborista, without much reaction. Later he tightened control over other aspects of
nationallife by elosing down most independent newspapers in 1950 and controlling the radio stations
and, later, television, so that the opposition had access only on rare occasions.
These were years of particular discredit to the social-democratic model in Argentina. It was reduced
to the confmes of a Socialist party that had been converted intoa minor member of a coalition of the
Center Right and ineluded a Radical party that had become a channel for conservative interests and
military conspiracies. After the fall of Perón in 1955, this political scheme continued, even worsened.
Many social-democrat politicians were converted from persecuted to persecutor, some of them demon-
strating a particular harshness toward the popular "mistaken" masses and an excessive flexibility in the
presence of new military regimes that would save the country fram the retum of peronismo.
Changes in the Ideological Climate
As the sixties moved on, the impact of the Cuban Revolution and events in France in May 1968
were strongly felt. The severe erasion of the Soviet model caused by more information about its re-
pressive practices made its erstwhile advocates align themselves with more radical models, like the
Chinese, or with the popular movements of the Third World. This realignment, in spite of its leading
to Messianism, had a positive component: it was the first reaction against the fixation with European
models. The conclusion was not long in coming: peronismo was the way to social revolution in Ar-
gentina. The natural versatility of this movement responded and soon an extreme left-wing sector was
formed among the real or self-proclaimed peronista activists. The shift toward peronismo was mas-
sive among the intelligentsia and the students and resulted in violence and a retum to power in 1973.
Peronismo became a broad coalition that accommodated the extreme Left and the extreme Right
This is not as strange as it seems, above all if one reexamines certain historical events. This
coexistence of extremes occurred in the last century in Mexico with Iturbide and, on a few occasions,
with Santa Anna. In Argentina, rosismo also showed this characteristic by unifying the remains of
Dorrego's liberal populist federalism with the conservative landowners and ultramontane Catholics. In
Europe these strange alliances are less frequent. Their greater incidence in the Third World is due to its
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uneven development and the coexistence of very different social systems. Incongruent social structures
are superimposed and their ideological expressions coexist creating strange alliances.
The ideological political convergence around peronismo in 1973 is one of the most extreme cases
of this kind of alliance. Social democracy was visibly absent, and the concem for democracy was very
tenuous, as large sectors of the alliance consi~ered it a simple bourgeois ploy. Some favored authori-
tarian solutions; others thought that "true democracy" would naturally emerge after the revolution. A
great many of the country's intelligentsia and students participated in this ideological frenzy, certainly
no worse than others that have affected humanity. Reality dealt hard blows to the participants in this
collective enthusiasm, first in the form of the eruption of the intemal contradictions of the coalition,
where the right-wing sector asserted itself, and later in the form of military repression.
The self-examination that the Argentine intellectual generation put itself through at the beginning
of the eighties produced a general disillusionment with the prescribed Marxist nationalist or peronista -
type revolutions and a reevaluation of democracy. It was no longer believed that a dialectic or some
other metaphysical mechanism guaranteed the final objective. This, added to a concem for social
change, should result in social democracy. Many sectors disillusioned by the Soviet or Chinese
experiences, or even by the Cuban experience, and not prepared to emulate Third World leaders, look at
European social democracy as an example of a genuine third position between savage capitalism and
totalitarian communism.
Similar events have occurred in other countries in the area. In aprismo and parties like Acción
Democrática in Venezuela and Liberación Nacional in Costa Rica, the progressive access to power and
the execution of moderate political reforms make them look for legitimization to the social-democratic
sources of their ideology, and to the prestigious European paradigm. In Brazil the political inheritors
ofvarguismo, principally in the Partido do Movimiento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), define them-
selves more and more as social democrats. Similar tendencies are expressed in the Partido Democrático
Trabalhista (pDT) and in the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT).
On the other hand, social democracy in Europe has abandoned the Cold War rigidity of the fifties.
It has slowly adopted pragmatic strategies, including electoral alliance with the Communists, and it has
opened communications with popular nationalist movements and Leninist revolutionaries, such as
those in Nicaragua. Concurrently, some socialist movements in southern Europe, such as Spain's,
which hardly a decade ago aspired to a "Mediterranean" identity that included the Libyan or Palestinian
revolutions, have adopted the political ideology and practice of European social democracy. During
these decades, social science theorizing has been redefining the role of the working class in the political
system. Few now think that the working class is the harbinger of the New Jerusalem, destined to rep-
resent humanity beca use of the disappearance and proletarianization of the remaining classes. Far from
that, technological development has increased middle-class jobs in the private sector, threatening to re-
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duce the working class to a pennanent minority; to avoid this it is necessary to incorporate the middle
class and the technical sectors in a socialist project.
Political parties in Argentina began to reactivate in the early eighties, addressing new militants to
the nuclei they had maintained during the long and sometimes desperate fight for democratic recovery.
Within this awakening the political sectors that were active in the intellectual community were incor-
porated. They had already been through a revision and reconsideration of their previous strategies.
What kind of a panorama did they face?
The rediscovered value of democracy made peronismo unattractive, in spite of its strong popular
and labor component. The classic peronismo of Perón's first presidency was little concerned with
public liberty and had a bad record in cultural and university matters. The fact that it represented labor
and trade unions was minimized by social science revision of the working-class role and by the
authoritarian or bureaucratic nature of the unions. The Radical party appeared to have a more demo-
cratic tradition, in spite of its history of involvement with the military during the resistance against
Perón's authoritarian regime. The links with the military forged by some Radical party leaders were
seen as occasional attempts to overcome totalitarian tendencies in the peronista governments, not as
part of a pennanent model. By contrast, relations of some of the peronista leaders with the military
were seen as the result of a major convergence of attitudes that sought to re-create an alliance between
the armed forces and the people. The Left was seen as a dinosaur, repeating old precepts.
The Alfonsinista Period
The maturation of the socialist intelligentsia in the country coincided with an open-mindedness
toward new strategies in the Unión Cívica Radical sector, headed by Raúl AlfonsÍn. For years he had
fought to direct the Radical party more to the left, overcoming its profound anti-peronismo, and had
tried to increase its electorate from the steadfast 25 percent that, with a few fluctuations, it had polledfor
decades. The possible incorporation of many modernized leftist sectors created a promising perspective.
The independent Left could claim more than 10 percent of the total electorate, as shown in the 1973
elections, where parties calling themselves leftist had won almost that much (to which one must add
those included in the Cámpora vote). Naturally, not all the Left would join radicalismo. But if 10
percent could be added to the traditional 25 percent,they would provide a basis from which to fight per-
onismo, which in the 1973 presidential election had polled (with some allies) 50 percent of the national
total. As the campaign developed during 1982 and 1983, two things happened: (1) it became more
certain that Alfonsín would get his 25 percent, plus 10 percent of the votes from the renovated Left;
(2) the Right, which had obtained almost 20 percent in 1973 by adding its many sectors, in the
majority voted for Alfonsín, even if it did not like the radicalleader's new partners. So in 1983, the
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Right retained only 5 percent of the total vote in its own parties, thus helping Alfonsín to the presi-
dency. The peronistas lost ten percentage points from the 1973 base. They lost not only the Left,
which had joined the Frente Justicialista of 1973, but also some of their traditional electorate, which
had been won over by the alfonsinistas.
Alfonsín's vic10ry helped consolidate democracy for two main reasons: first, his party had clearer
democratic convictions; second, it guaranteed the military and the Right a smoother transition than did
peronismo. This second reason deserves careful consideration.
Toward the end of the military dictatorship, there was talk of a "military-trade union pact" by
which military and trade union bureaucrats would cooperate in maintaining oligarchical control over the
corporate system and predominant interest groups. The Unión Cívica Radical was seen as the party of
civil propriety and ethics, determined to dismantle the harmful structures of the de facto corporativism
that the country had endured for so many decades. In this perspective, peronismo-the main voice of
the bureaucratized trade unions.~ould be seen as occupying a position to the right of the Radicales.
The latter appeared more leftist, although not extreme, and above all more inclined 10introduce changes
to the existing corporativist power structure.
This perspective is, in my view, wrong, although it reflects part of the truth. It overemphasizes
the purely political aspects of the Argentine social structure, leaving asid e the economic and class
components. It also ignores the fact that practically all of the military coups that have taken place in
the country since 1945 have been directed against existing or foreseeable peronista governments. The
military has never worried about a Radical party victory; at most it has been nervous about a govern-
ment like Frondizi's in 1962 or Illia's in 1966 being too weak and therefore allowing a peronista re-
turno The main conflict in Argentina is not between the military or corporate establishment on one
side, and a democratic, moral force on the other; it is, rather, between the right-wing military-business
sector and the popular movement, mainly peronista, which includes most trade unions. In this con-
frontation the Radical party remains in the middle, with occasional alliances in either direction. When
it sides with peronismo and other forces against the military dictatorship, it leans toward the Left.
When, as in the 1983 presidential elections, it confronts peronismo, it is undeniably leaning to the
Right.
So is the "military-trade union pact" a mere illusion? Not necessarily. Since peronismo is the
main historical opponent of the military-like aprismo in Peru-it is necessary for it to seek to coex-
ist with its adversaries in order to reach a truce. The Radical party does not have 10make such a pact
because no one suspects that it would attack the foundation of the military-business structure. The
peronistas, on the other hand, could easily slip in10 a confrontational policy because of the social
structure of their support. It is true that the peronista threat affects the business sector more than the
military. But the two are connected, and in spite of appearances the business sector of the Right is
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more important than the military, even in a country as affected by militarism as Argentina. The reason
is that the machine that propels the military to intervention is fed, in great part, by the fear that spreads
among the dominant classes of what a peronista government would do to them.
In answer to this analysis it is said-to paraphrase Arthur Koestler-that one is not responsible for
unsolicited support. It is asserted that the situation of the Unión Cívica Radical in Argentina is com-
parable to that of the Socialist party in France, which opposes a business-based Right and an authori-
tarian Left, that is, the Communist party, which is more involved with the trade unions than is the
Socialist party. The role of the Communist party in France would be played by the peronistas in Ar-
gentina. The comparison is partly valid, but something must be kept in mind. In France, although it
is true that Mitterrand is, in a certain sense, to the right of communism, he confronts to his right no
less than 50 percent of the electorate and its corresponding political party structures and interest groups.
In 1983 in Argentina hardly 5 percent of the electorate was to the right of the alfonsinista vote. In
1987, 13 percent, including provincial parties, occupied this position, but that is still very little. In
any event, abandoned by some of the voters from the Right, plus others from the Left, the Unión
Cívica Radicallost the election in 1987.
Another comparable case is Peru, where the apristas, led by Alan García, got 50 percent of the vote
while the Izquierda Unida, on the Left, won 25 percent. But to the right of aprismo there remains an-
other quarter of the electorate, which is represented by the right-wing Partido Popular Cristiano and the
Center Right group, Acción Popular. Aprismo is certainly more right wing than the Izquierda Unida,
but it maintains a strong foothold in the popular and trade union sectors, such that one can still talk of
a social-democratic option adapted to Peruvian conditions. Flanked by a party or group of parties on
the left, it resembles the Socialist party in France. In contrast, the Argentinian Radical party faces too
many votes to its left (or toward the bottom of the social pyramid), at least 50 percent, and very few to
its right (or the top of the pyramid), 5 percent in 1983, and 13 percent in 1987, including the provin-
cial parties.
It is also argued, retuming to the theme of military-civilian polarization, that Alfonsín took the
military to the courts, jailing most Junta members. It is possible that under a peronista government
greater limits would have been imposed, in one way or another, or pardons or amnesty would have been
extended, in my judgment, not only becasue of the existence of right-wing sectors in peronismo-
which cannot be denied-but also because the greater presence of anti-status quo elements in pero-
nismo makes it potentially dangerous to the ruling classes and forces its leadership to soft-pedal on
actions that might infuse panic in many levels of the military-business sector. The Radical party gov-
ernment, on the other hand, just beca use it knows that it does not instill panic in the business
community, can undertake to do a specific job on certain military sectors.
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Toward a New Coalition
It is a fact that right-wing groups sti11exist within the peronista party in quantities not equaled in
the Radical party. How does this agree with my earlier statement that peronismo is genera11ymore to
the left than the Radical party? The answer should be obvious: in both cases it has to do with coali-
tions between social actors, and with particular conditions in Argentina that, as with many countries of
the Third World, favor the creation of very heterogeneous alliances in the popular sector.
Social democracy requires the combination of at least two elements: a unionized working class,
and a group of inte11ectualswith a strong technical component (technocrat, or, in other words, Fabian).
Without these two components there can be democracy, sometimes even social improvement, but not a
social-democratic project. Admittedly, it could be argued that it does not matter if there is no "social-
democratic project" if democracy is consolidated and offers some social improvement. If the peronistas
were in power, they probably could not do more in terms of social improvements, given the limita-
tions set by intemational economic conditions. Have not Fran~ois Mitterrand or Felipe González had
to take steps backwards, even to the point of confronting sectors of the working class and the trade
unions?
The argument is cogent; after a11,for some reason, the majority of the social-democratic intelli-
gentsia have rallied around Alfonsín. They see in him more respect, greater freedom, a better guarantee
that the democratic institutions of the country will be consolidated, starting with the ones that operate
in the party itself. For the intelligentsia the consolidation of democracy has definitely been accepted as
a precondition of any form of socialismo That is not enough, of course, but in no way should the in-
stitutional system be endangered, nor should it be argued that it is a bourgeois democracy, and therefore
questionable and replaceable by one that is more genuine.
Peronismo, alLhough its leadership leveIs have been notably renovated, still maintains strongly
intolerant characteristics. This, in part, reflects the authoritarianism typical of the most humble levels
of Argentinian society, although it is also derived from the participation of the inte11ectual right-wing
sectors. In certain provinces and in vaRíous trade unions the renovation has not been very thorough.
Peronismo needs more time to eliminate the many elements that are clearly harrnful to democracy in
daily life, in the institutions it controls, and in cultural affairs. This last area is particularly important
to the intelligentsia, because it deals with their area of activity. The tendency to purify peronismo ex-
ists, but it is neither automatic nor inevitable. It must be generated as much from inside the peronista
movement as from outside, by those who would be disposed to collaborate with a thoroughly modem-
izedjusticialismo. It must be purified of certain components that might have been inevitable in previ-
ous stages of national development-that were necessary to form a triumphant coalition like that of
1943-1946-but are harrnful today for political as well as ethical and ideological reasons.
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Let us return to the thesis that social democracy requires, besides a consolidated democracy, a
mechanism for social reformo This mechanism, undoubtedly limited by the external and internal
conditions of the economy and class structure, must always be as bold as possible. For this it must
have the strength of the trade unions directly incorporated into the party or indirectly allied with it. At
the very least. a large portion of the trade unions should favor the social-democratic movement, and the
rest, although they may support a different party, should not strongly oppose social democracy. For
this reason, the Radical party is not an adequate expression of social democracy in Argentina, in spite
of the intentions of some of its leaders. I am not criticizing concrete measures, including the exces-
sively recessionist economic policy it has adopted. Spain and France have also at times adopted similar
policies under social-democratic governments. What is important is whether or not the two indispens-
able elements we previously referred to, that is, the intelligentsia and the trade unions, are in the
political-partisan "house" that we are examining. They are not part of the Radical party, which is
therefore not a social-democratic force. But neither are they both present in peronismo. Where to go
then? To one of the smalI groups of the purer Left? These are toa minor fight toa much among
themselves to become important leaders in the project. It is necessary to take them into account,
however, and not only those with explicit social-democratic conviction, so as to utilize their enthusi-
asm and power of mobilization.
For the moment, the continuation of another Radical presidency better guarantees democratic sta-
bility. It also prevents peronismo from prematurely assuming power and gives it time to transform
itselfpermanently. In the long run,justicialismo is a more adequate channel for social democracy, not
as the only party representing the project, but as one component in a new alliance that should include
an explicitly socialist sector, electoralIy smalIer, but not negligible. What is required is not a mere
coalition between justicialismo (43 percent of the national vote in 1987, including local schisms) and
the Left (7 percent divided almost equally among intransigents, social democrats, Trotskyites, and
Communists, one part of which is not usable due to its extremism). What is necessary is that from
justicialismo, or from a sector of the renovated Left, a powerful appeal, as shattering of party structures
as was of alfonsinismo at its height, be made for participation in a new project.
To summarize, the social-democratic model does not have an adequate place in the party spectrum
in Argentina today. It is legitimate enough, though, for individuals with that ideology to militate in
the Radical party, strengthening its role as defender of an incipient democracy; or in peronismo , so that
it can thoroughly reno vate its structure; or in the various self-proclaimed leftist parties, helping them
to adapt to the national reality. But eventualIy the next step must be taken, the formation of a coali-
tion aroundjusticialismo and the trade unions, both partially renovated, and with an infusion of social-
ist ideology based on Latin American intelIectual traditions, not European. The project can only func-
tion if a wide appeal is made to the intelIectual sector, the young as welI as the technocrats, to con-
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verge with the parties of the popular area. This would in no way mean a rebirth of the Frente
Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI) of 1973, although it would involve many of the people that
supported it. In 1973 the FREJULI combined, in a very traditional populist way, the extreme Right
andthe extreme Left, with mutually manipulative intentions and great violence. Few had a c1ear con-
ception of the democratic system, allhough Perón, at least in speeches, demonstrated an excellent
knowledge of its basic tenets, which he had absorbed during his exile in Madrid. The same cannot be
said of some of his actions, for by surrounding himself with advisers and friends like López Rega, he
direct1ycontradicted his acquired faith in democracy.
But the conditions under which the FREJULI was formed and acted are better left to future histori-
ans to pondero The difference between the FREJULI and what is proposed here is evident. Extreme
positions would no longer be present, or would be extremely minoritarian, although some individual s
who supported them in the past might reappear after a change of heart. There would no longer be a
mythological belief in the working c1ass but, instead, a conviction of the necessity of its organized
presence. The concessions that everyone must make to consolidate the whole would be easier if a
highly federative structure, guaranteeing areas of autonomy, predominates. As for the intellectuals,
they should bear in mind that as social democracy had lo make concessions to social reality to be able
to take root in Europe, similar but different adaptations must evolve in Latin America.
(This is an edited version of a paper presented to the Seminar on Social Democracy, organized by the
Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, in Rio de Janeiro, 24-27
November 1987. Translated by Anne Quiroga.)
